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Abstract 
There are many ways of interpreting the so-called ‘new technologies’. One of 
the most interesting is that which stems from defining them as a social 
imaginary, and therefore, as collective beliefs, fears and hopes. It is common to 
attribute to technologies all manner of threats that, founded or not, are real in 
the measure that the society makes decisions and acts in a way consistent with 
this conviction.
The fears and anxieties of society lead to a consideration of the limits of the 
human that technologies transgress. Among the figures with which one speaks 
about these limits there is Frankenstein, the modern Prometheus, which threat-
ens modern fantasies with its deformity. There is, however, another man-made 
creature that can serve to orient our reflection, the Golem.
In 1609, 400 years ago, Rabbi Loew died. He is credited with the creation 
of a homunculus by combining of secret codes. The problem of the Golem was 
its imperfect soul made manifest in its lack of speech. Its silent presence was 
a source of great fear in the community that finally asked to get rid of the 
creature.
These figures of monstrosity, Frankenstein and above all Golem, will help 
us to make technologies understand from the fear that society projects onto 
them, and this will lead us to the question concerning the imaginary fears of 
the technological system.
Modern technologies: unspeakable or destroyed?  
In the summer of 1816, Mary Shelly conceived a nameless monster 
made by a Dr. Victor von Frankenstein out of electricity and body 
parts. Between 1811 and 1816, the workers movement of followers of 
the legendary Ned Ludd reached its pinnacle, destroying machinery in 
England. In the same decade, the most industrialized nation at the 
time witnessed the birth of two distinctive symbols of the modern 
imaginary that would accompany thought and reflection about tech-
nology and fear: a novel leaving nameless man’s piece of work -the 
creature of Dr. Frankenstein has no name-; and workers destroying 
machinery which they viewed as an enemy. The fear inspired by these 
symbols is not a fear of God, nor witches, nor spirits but rather of the 
very product of the rationality and work of man.
The fear of technology constitutes as intimate an element of 
modernity as the idea of progress. Fear is the other side of the coin of 
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progressive optimism.  Although it has been denied, exorcized as irra-
tional and labelled as ‘reactionary’ or ‘regressive’, it is, for that very 
reason, a constitutive and characteristic element of modern times. 
In its fear of technology, modernity manifests its hidden perception 
of technological progress. ‘Neo-luddism’ facing the ‘digital revolution’ 
and the ‘anarchic-primitivist’ philosophy are probably two extreme 
present-day reactions caused by the fear of technology, of which 
Theodore Kaczynski’s letter bombs and his manifesto, Unabomber, con-
stitute two of the most important milestones. 
Modern technology represents an unparalleled power in the story 
of mankind. A power that drags human beings in a hurricane rush 
towards ‘progress’. Modernity implies the dawn of new powers of 
human action: revolutionary political action; democratic power; the 
conquest of the planet; and, of course, the power of technology. 
Of these, modern technology seems to concentrate all expecta-
tions, synthesizing man’s unlimited possibilities. It’s a new power as 
well as a new fear. The medieval power of God gives way before the 
power of modern technology; even though this new fear is not as 
new as it seems, since it appears to be weaved as a metamorphosis of 
man’s ancient fear towards the products of his own hand. Thus it 
appears to suggest, among other things, the full title of Shelley’s 
novel: Frankenstein. The Modern Prometheus. 
Technologies: fear and the imaginary 
Imaginaries of fear and imaginary fear are two ways to name the pos-
sible relations between fear and the imaginary. The idea of ‘imaginar-
ies of fear’ may permit the elaboration of a typology of fear in its 
relation with technologies, as it results from the analysis of, for exam-
ple, fiction (writings, audiovisuals, etc.), ordinary life (by deep inter-
views and other qualitative methods) and political action (NGO’s, 
national laws, warnings from international organizations, etc.); or also 
through the analysis of non-fictional texts such as news and media 
broadcasts. In these cases, the analyst could make an interpretation of 
the collective fear of technology and compare it with other kinds of 
fears in other societies and cultures and with a history of fear. 
This is an interesting path for a sociology of fear and, above all, for 
an interpretation of technologies through the perspectives of suspicion, 
mistrust and dread, but what interests me in this paper is a reflection 
on the imaginary component in the fear of technology. But what kind 
of fear is not imaginary? What is the imaginary component of fear? Is 
there any fear without an imaginary element? Fear, threat, and insecu-
rity go hand in hand with the concept of the imaginary understood as 
horror towards emptiness, nothingness, towards a desert without ref-
erences and a space and time without explicit boundaries.  
Fear begins, not with the darkness which the child dreads, but 
with the absence of referential images (mental, metaphorical, etc.) to 
clarify the meaning of what is being seen or being imagined without 
knowing if it exists or not. Fear emerges when the closures of the 
social world (those internalized during individual socialization) do 
not provide certainty and safety. Thus, what should be considered 
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first are the threats – whether real or imaginary – that technologies 
represent for the constellations of sense for the society. These constel-
lations are defined as the group of beliefs, yearnings, expectations, 
wishes, etc., that regulate and legitimate a certain social order. When 
a threat is identified and made visible, the symbolic closure of a cul-
ture shatters, exposing its imaginary foundation.
‘The phantom menace’ constitutes one of the most famous military 
metaphors produced by the film industry in the last third of the twen-
tieth century; war is always justified, at least by its promoters, as a 
threat that functions as long as it’s imagined and believed by every-
one. The ‘phantom menace’ destroys human bodies and its societies 
because the interpretation of a situation causes the action. Those who 
control fear, control those who are fearful. From magical and religious 
powers to modern technocracies, political power has found the key to 
dominion in the politics of fear. 
Every child usually has a sensation of fear that comes from an 
unknown source of noises, usually in the darkness of the night – in the 
fields, in a new home, etc. – in which stalking monsters project them-
selves. The advice of grown-ups, not always effective, consists of ‘turn-
ing the light on, looking around, and confronting’, so that the alleged 
monster is seen for what it is – the moving branch of a tree behind the 
window. Illuminating and looking become ways to lose or face fear. In 
society the right information could, and should, fulfil similar functions, 
but history has shown that it is not always so.  
Contemporary technologies, in the midst of the complexity of their 
mechanisms (technical, cultural, etc.) are, as the branch in the chil-
dren’s night, a factor of fear, but, unlike the tree shaken by the wind, 
all light shed by technology increases miscomprehension of its persist-
ing concealment. The veil of the mysterious is not just a consequence 
of its complexity, it’s also the effect of its symbolic centrality for con-
temporary society, converting it in the shade of its fantasies, dreams 
and cravings.
Even though the ghosts that haunt the nightmares of societies, and 
which are frequently expressed in the fictional world of motion pic-
tures, may be pure fantasy, the real fear and its consequences are, most 
of the time, very real. History shows that fiction is ahead of reality and 
that reality always supersedes fiction in seriousness.   
Technologies as social imaginary
In speaking of technologies, what I’m referring to are modern technolo-
gies, particularly those of information and communication. For the sake 
of brevity I’ll refer to them as ‘new technologies’ or just ‘technologies’ so 
as to clearly show their distinctiveness as empty words that nevertheless 
designate a set of machines, software programs, institutions, etc. What I 
am interested in highlighting in the use of this empty phrase with no 
fixed reference – ‘new technologies’ – is that it constitutes the symbolic 
node of the ‘telecommunicational imaginary’ by which the so-called knowl-
edge and information society is nourished. “New technologies” is a 
empty name that has multiple and indefinite meaning that permits the 
projection of different devices and, of course, diverse fantasies. 
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In another work I have defined ‘new technologies’ as ‘the heteroge-
neous set of devices, institutions and discourses’ (cfr. Cabrera 2006a: 
153–161). Heterogeneity refers to an external stratum constituting a 
conglomerate of various gadgets, institutions of very different origins 
and fragmented discourses of varied levels. That is why the ideas of 
‘convergence’ and ‘integration’ acquire special relevance, not only in a 
technological but also in a symbolic way. What is most important is 
that this heterogeneity supposes a more radical level, in as much as 
new technologies constitute a social-imaginary institution. They do not 
just respond to human ‘needs’, they are not strictly ‘functional’; there 
are no previously defined needs that they aim to satisfy. The very def-
inition of ‘needs’ is already an answer to the human capacity to grow. 
Technologies base themselves in the real world but are not its neces-
sary consequence. 
The imaginary institution of modern technology is made manifest 
at the limit of ‘technological rationality’, in the imperative that regu-
lates scientists’ and technicians’ behaviour and logic – and along with 
them those of politicians and businessmen: ‘what can be done will be 
done’. The simple availability of technology makes it our duty to use 
it. The course of action becomes necessary because ‘if I don’t do it (sci-
entist, enterprise, nation, etc.), somebody else will’.
A rational and realistic person, company or country experiences 
‘technological progress’ as something necessary and binding. Any 
other attitude leads to an ‘idealistic’ or ‘romantic’ stance, interpreted 
as one that is unrealistic.
As a social imaginary, new technologies can acquire the status of an 
institution depending on the existing conditions of possibility, exist-
ence and representation of sense of a concrete society. To interpret 
technologies is to understand the conditions that have made possible a 
specific heterogeneous complex and no other; that have allowed a con-
crete reality to emerge and no other; and that have set a certain mean-
ing and no other. As imaginary institutions, technologies are not only 
a collection of ‘technological advances’, they are a jumble of represen-
tations, affects and desires by which society understands, feels, thinks, 
lives, compares and projects itself.
Defined in this way, technologies constitute the centre of an inter-
pretation of the human condition in a society that dreams, defines and 
calls itself a society of ‘knowledge’ and ‘information’. Fantasies refer to 
those names and images, but also to their fears and cravings. For this 
kind of interpretation we will have to take into account the matrix and 
patterns of the imaginary of Judeo-Christian, Greek, western and 
European societies.
Technique as a monstrous creation  
The creationist imaginary widespread in the West finds its origin in 
the divine creation of the universe. Human action stands as a sec-
ondary creation before it, both chronologically as in importance. 
True creation belongs to God. It’s man’s role to ‘uncover’ its beauty, 
truth and usefulness. He can also ‘mix up’ and ‘combine’ the ele-
ments in order to obtain something ‘new’. Over this creationist 
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imaginary lays a burden of obligation and guilt: the obligation to 
continue God’s creation as a divine call.  This does not imply imper-
fection of the world, but a complementation between that which is 
given and the co-creationist task of the creature. Thus, human inven-
tiveness ‘un-covers’ and ‘reveals’ what, in a certain way, was always 
already there. Man’s action brings into being the potentialities of 
God’s creation – potentialities that he must realize through his 
action, that is to say, make real. This obligation entails a prohibition: 
do not act capriciously and with autonomy, do not pretend to be like 
God, carrying out human creativity on a whim. Creation and crea-
tivity are divine attributes, when man follows nature’s encrypted 
patterns he becomes its collaborator and co-creator. 
In this imaginary, human creation stands always second, confined 
mostly to art, the sphere par excellence of divine inspiration. Until 
very recently, technique and technology where mostly considered only 
as means to solve problems and needs through the combination of ele-
ments. Owing to this, the prohibition that weighs on free creative 
human action transformed fears into myths about the monstrous char-
acter of technological work. The man that whimsically exercises his 
capacity of technical creation risks the apparatus turning against him. 
The autonomy of creative human action is punished with the increas-
ing autonomy of technological work that, in the long run, turns against 
its creator, even to the point of threatening his own existence. Creative 
man is only capable of producing a monster – a second-rate creation – 
that sooner or later will turn against him. 
Fear and monstrosity: the limits of action
Etymologically, the word ‘monster’ means ‘prodigy’ and, as such, 
refers to the will of the gods. This prodigy designated something 
confused and deviated and was seen as an aberration; it is fantastic 
and because of that an aberration. The relationship between fear and 
monster seems to come from the fact that the latter dwells in the 
imaginary, embodying man’s worst fears and thus becoming his 
worst enemy. 
In this sense, it’s interesting to remember that the noun ‘monster’ 
comes from the Latin monstrum, ‘divine portent or warning, monster’, 
from monere ‘warn’ and the Latin verb monstrare, ‘to show’ (OED 
Second Edition): ‘1. be, allow, or make visible. 2. exhibit or produce for 
inspection or viewing. 3. represent or depict in art. [...] 5. demonstrate 
or prove. […] 7. explain or demonstrate something to’. And also de 
verb demonstrare, ‘demonstrate’ (OED Second Edition): ‘1. clearly show 
that (something) exists or is true. 2. give a practical exhibition and 
explanation of. [...] 4. take part in a public demonstration’.
Today monstrousness has two connotations: aesthetic, according to 
which monster means deformation and disproportion, and moral, 
implying a hidden evil in man. The monster shows the existence of 
wickedness within man. Man’s monstrous products bring to light his 
inner deformity and disclose as otherness that which is his own. 
Consequently, they exorcize evilness and discharge fear and guilt in 
something alien to the human community. 
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There have always been monsters, but the genre of horror literature 
is a product of the Enlightenment. There is an inner malevolence that 
comes out and frightens; this sets limits that should not be crossed. 
Monsters embody prohibitions and fears, becoming guardians of ‘non-
plus ultra’ technological action. The monster is man’s ‘other’ – an 
‘other’ locked up within him, but that cannot be experienced as some-
thing existing in oneself. This seems to suggest that technological arte-
facts constantly become man’s mirror: a mirror reflecting a crazy and 
out-of-control omnipotence. 
Technology is man’s product and, as such, has something human 
in its heart. The machine is born inside man and holds a sign of its 
own; its relation with man begins in man’s own inside. Technique 
makes manifest the possibilities of human action; its monstrous aspect 
probably comes from fear of what it might reveal. It offers man other 
possibilities, making him more powerful. He feels more potent and 
thus begins to fear himself. The potential unleashed by technology 
hinders the possibility of predicting its outcomes, effects and conse-
quences, from the moment man creates to lose control over its crea-
tion. The technical oeuvre opens a new world that can never be 
completely predicted by its creator. The mere presence of the artefact 
produces a situation almost unknown to his maker. That is why no 
creation is complete without its appropriation and use. But what the 
use of the artefact manifests is already present in its technical being. 
What is present is man himself as a non-practical creator, that is to say, 
a creator that takes no account of means in relation to ends or of meet-
ing necessities. The man that is manifested in technical creation is not 
practical; this can be seen in the multiple ‘accidents’ and ‘coincidences’ 
from which his ‘inventions’ and ‘discoveries’ are born. 
Fear and monstrosity: technology as a source of fear 
The naive view of techniques and technologies conceives them as a 
series of inventions and discoveries made possible by the development 
of human rationality as man faced the problems posed by his adapta-
tion to the surrounding world. But when we analyze the history of 
modern technology and its significance things appear under a whole 
new light. Modern technology does not come from its medieval coun-
terpart and neither is it an extension of it; it answers much more to 
such things as witchcraft, magic, alchemy and astrology. These consti-
tute the background of modern technique and it is in them that we 
must search for its meaning. They all, witchcraft, magic, alchemy and 
astrology, imply an exploration of the limits of human creativity within 
the vast domains of the imagination.  
History shows that in the Middle Ages technique was not part of 
established knowledge. In a world where contemplation was all that 
mattered, technical activity was a regulated craft, but it was not 
considered a domain of knowledge. It is no wonder that there are 
almost no historical references or popular myths about technologies 
threatening or striking fear among people. Fear in popular fantasies 
had to do with magic, alchemy and witchcraft; or, at any rate, with 
‘others’ such as the Jews, the Moors, heretics, etc. The combination of 
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odd practices with ‘strangeness’ or ‘otherness’ puts its practitioners at 
the centre of attention and placed them under suspicion of diabolic 
performances: use of human fluids, dead animals, orgies, etc. It’s no 
wonder either that these kinds of accusations were used as ‘arguments’ 
in persecutions of these others. Collective fear had clear and coherent 
references in the imaginary of the time. 
In this context, the relationship of the Jewish Cabbala with alchemy 
and magic must be highlighted. Medieval magic and alchemy shared 
some important principles with the Cabbala, forming at the time a cor-
pus of certain coherence and great importance. Within this framework 
we must interpret the legendary figure of the Golem as a symbol of 
technology (see Idel 1996). 
The Golem is a Jewish classic from the times of persecution, when 
Jewish religious elements came in close proximity to the practices of 
magic and alchemy. There is nothing new in emphasizing some of the 
important overlaps between alchemistic and cabbalistic elements, such 
as the hermetic principle ‘as above, so below; as below, so above’, or, 
most of all, the importance of the human word as a revelatory of divine 
secrets. 
Today, the Golem is something acknowledged but not necessarily 
known. Its modern fame dates from the eponymous novel written by 
Gustav Meyrik and the motion pictures of Paul Wegener, of which we 
know the 1920 version. Gershom Scholem interpreted it in the context 
of the Cabbala. Borges took it up among other writings in Handbook of 
Fantastic Zoology (1957) or The Book of Imaginary Beings (1967), as well as 
in a beautiful poem (The Golem, 1958). A black Golem is a character in 
the popular movie The Santo and Blue Demon against Dr. Frankenstein 
(El Santo y Blue Demon contra el Dr. Frankenstein, México 1973, 
directed by Miguel Delgado) about the famous Mexican wrestling 
idols; it also appeared in Marvel comics as a Warsaw Jewish defender 
against the Nazi invaders; and it even appeared in the fourth episode 
of The Simpsons’ eighteenth season (Treehouse of Horror XVII) – the 
sequel to which was called You gotta know when to Golem (an image 
taken from a Wegener film). The Tel Aviv newspaper Yediot Ahranot 
publishes a very popular Uri Kink comic named The Golem: The 
Adventures of an Israeli Superhero, reflecting the irony, contradictions 
and complexities of his country’s society. 
On the other hand, there is no guidebook to Prague that doesn’t 
mention the old Jewish cemetery where the grave of Rabbi Loew – the 
creator of the Golem – lies, and his old synagogue, where the room 
which was forbidden to be opened for fear of liberating his remains is 
still sealed. But then again, this is the same city that organizes a film 
festival that bestows the ‘Gold Golem’. Even though these references are 
not exhaustive, they give an idea of how popular the figure of the 
Golem has become and warn us, today more than ever, to be careful 
when mentioning it.   
To clarify the place of the Golem in the Jewish world, the quota-
tion already cited from ‘The Idea of the Golem’ in On the Kabbalah and 
its Symbolisms, by Gershom Scholem (1960) is fundamental. But con-
cerning its relationship with technology, the famous 1964 essay of 
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Norbert Wiener, God and Golem Inc., a Comment on Certain Points where 
Cybernetics Impinges on Religion, is of the utmost importance. 
In this little book Wiener considers, in some detail, the social conse-
quences of cybernetics, particularly those concerning the relationship 
between science and religion. In this framework three issues stand out: 
learning machines; self-reproducing machines; the coordination 
between man and machine. The answers to these very much take into 
account the story in Genesis of the divine creation. 
Man makes man in his own image. This seems to be the echo or the pro-
totype of the act of creation, by which God is supposed to have made 
man in His image. Can something similar occur in the kind less compli-
cated (and perhaps more understandable) case of the nonliving systems 
that we call machines? 
(Wiener 1964: 29)
Is technology made in its creator’s own image and likeliness, just as 
man is made in God’s? Wiener’s answer is yes: man is able to create a 
machine capable of creating machines. What is a machine for Wiener? 
‘For us, a machine is a device for converting incoming messages into 
outgoing messages. Thus the machine may generate the message, and 
the message may generate another machine’ (Wiener 1964: 32, 36).
For the idea that God’s supposed creation of man and the animals, the 
begetting of living beings according to their king, and the possible repro-
duction of machines are all part of the same order of phenomena, is 
emotionally disturbing […] If it is an offense against our self-pride to be 
compared to an ape, we have now got pretty well over it; and it an even 
greater offense to be compared to a machine.
 (Wiener 1964: 57)
Herein lays the problem of Creation, putting man in the place of God, 
as creator of a creative creature – an activity comparable only to magic, 
the alchemy of transmutations, or even sorcery. More than forty years 
later, Wiener’s essay is still even more accurate in its limits and pos-
sibilities. Nevertheless, in terms of social imaginary, the creative 
machine – in man’s own image – is alive and kicking, haunting the 
dreams and insomnia of society.  
Golem vs. Frankenstein and the new technologies
In my opinion, the Golem is a more adequate metaphor for under-
standing new technologies than the story of Frankenstein’s monstrous 
creation. The nameless creature of Dr. Victor von Frankenstein implies 
a technique uniting separate parts that attain life through the use of 
electrical energy. This image may be useful for mechanical pre-digital 
era technologies, before computers made possible Leibniz’s dream and 
made feasible his binary system: a universal code into which all exist-
ing things can be translated, an exact binary code to which everything 
can be adapted, translating its ‘reality’ to zeros and ones.  Ever since 
genetics began speaking of the ‘code of life’, with its language and 
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coding, the same metaphor sets out to manifest technology’s raison 
d’être. It’s not only a question of the power to translate, but also of the 
power to create, Wiener himself warned. Find a code and the possibil-
ity to manipulate it, thus converting technologies into a second reality: 
cyborg, virtual reality, electronic simulation, etc. 
New technologies are aiming to create the Golem. Not a being made 
out of body parts, as Frankenstein, but out of the river’s fertile soil. 
Every day technological materiality produces new prototypes, every 
day it overcomes new obstacles, but the ‘code of life’ still does not 
achieve speaking autonomy and thus creative intelligence. The key 
still seems to be in a software capable not only of making a machine 
work, but of giving it autonomous life, making it in man’s own image 
and likeness, like creating like.    
The cabbalistic problem concerning the clay homunculus was to 
find the key to bring it to life, to vivify it and make it autonomous. The 
Golem, as an amorphous entity or sheer matter, claimed with its pres-
ence the search for the ‘code of life’, which like the divine breath would 
grant the mystery of life. The Golem is not made out of parts – a word 
can either give it life or take it away and send it back to dust. 
Frankenstein vs. the Golem represents the dispute between 
mechanical and digital metaphors: on the one hand, there are tech-
nologies dealing with visible and unified parts, establishing effective-
ness by similarity physical mechanics (stepping down is  braking, the 
turn of the wheel is moving forward); on the other, a materiality func-
tioning with an invisible effectiveness that appears as magic to the 
user’s perception. 
The horrors of the twentieth century made it clear that technologi-
cal achievements connect with evil in an almost mystical way. 
Technologies are not just instruments or tools in the hands of evil peo-
ple, as can be, for instance, a knife or a gun. In themselves, they consti-
tute a way to face the world, to deal with it, to look at it and define it. 
Several humanistic perspectives add to this idea of technology as a 
socio-technical system, where apparatuses carry their own social and 
cultural origin. In consequence, technological craft is seen as envel-
oped by evil. And, deep down, man is thought to take the place of God 
through his technological skill, as in the biblical passage of the Tower 
of Babel. Thus, moral and political appreciation of technology seems to 
function within the technological imaginary, as if it were a challenge to 
God with man trying to take God’s place, putting himself in the place 
of the creator. In this way, creation is perceived as an evil post-Eden 
ground. To think about creation outside the imaginary that perceives 
man as a secondary creator constitutes a real challenge for a rigorous 
thinking about technological innovation.   
It is very difficult to consider technology outside the imaginary of 
the Judeo-Christian divine creation in which man is seen as artist, 
sculptor, builder, but not creator of technology. Technological crea-
tion implies a sort of Faustian bargain, and the price to pay for those 
who engage in it is the weight of guilt. There has been no great inven-
tor or scientist that has not believed himself to be a messenger of God 
or as a divine instrument for the development of true values. (I’m not 
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referring here to the divine instruments of the Justice of God in the 
Muslim world but rather, for example, to the scientists who took part 
in the Manhattan Project, during and after World War II.)
Wiener calls those passionate scientists and technicians who redi-
rect their worshiping attitude to God towards artefacts ‘gadget wor-
shipers’. These ‘worshipers’ revere machines since they are not 
restrained by man’s limitations, such as tiredness, laziness, lack of 
accuracy, etc. That is why ‘gadget worshipers’ entrust machines with 
complex decisions requiring objectivity. According to Wiener, these 
gadget worshipers ‘go beyond a legitimate curiosity and are sinful in 
themselves’ (Wiener 1964: 53).
Nevertheless, my intention is to point out the role played by ‘God 
worshipers’, not in the literal sense of the expression, but symbolizing 
the ethical attitude of condemnation towards technology. Behind tech-
nology’s pessimistic evaluation lies the guilt of having replaced God as 
creator, of having become autonomous. The occidental creationist 
imaginary encloses a reflection that might emerge from other perspec-
tives. In this sense, Wiener maintains that:
As long as automata can be made […] the study of their making and 
their theory is a legitimate phase of human curiosity, and human intel-
ligence is stultified when man sets fixed bounds to the curiosity.
(Wiener 1964: 53).
Are there limits to scientific and technological curiosity? The extreme 
stand point of the ‘gadget worshiper’ is clear: the technological impera-
tive is the only limit – that which can be done will be done – but is there 
some middle ground between this point of view and extreme Luddism?
Modernity launches the era of territories without warnings. 
Through its assertion, the ‘non plus ultra’ becomes an imperative to 
observe in order to acquire knowledge and to know in order to domi-
nate. In Rome’s ancient maps there would usually be an inscription 
reading ubi leones, as a warning against crossing the limits. Similarly, 
illustrations of monsters on ancient maps signalled where unknown 
seas. With modernity comes a map without limits or monsters and 
since Magellan’s and Elcano’s global voyages, territories are repre-
sented on a sphere, symbolizing that which is perfectly defined and 
contained within itself. 
The Golem is a metaphor for prohibition, according to which the 
technicians’ effort to attain perfection in his craft will always be con-
sidered futile or, at least, useless. In this situation, technology will 
always be interpreted as a secondary creation, the product of a crea-
ture having the chance to act autonomously but with imperfection. 
As such, technology will not be able to create; as in the case of 
hybrids, it will be incapable of procreating. The inability to conceive is 
the mark of identity of the products of human labour in the creationist 
imaginary. Within this framework, procreation is reserved only for the 
Son, the ‘true’ image and likeness of man. 
Fear of technology is provoked by the possibility of its independ-
ence, by the risk that it may turn against man, and furthermore, by the 
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chance that man’s creation may be able to create, in turn, a different 
world. God created man and placed him in a garden, and, through his 
twisted work, man created another space, that of exile. Technology, as 
a work of man, creates its own world, and just as God lives shut up in 
his garden, man could live in the prison of the technological world. 
Technology, insofar as it has something of man in it, constitutes the 
existential space to which man has to adapt himself.  
Paradise and exile: the soul of technology 
Fear consists in the image of an autonomous work turning against its 
maker and, just like Adam and Eve, escaping from the hands of its 
creator. The solution consists in the creature’s exile from a pleasant 
world to a hostile one. In the harmonious setting, creature and creator 
walked together at ‘the time of the breeze’; in the hostile one, they can-
not find each other because, in a certain sense, in the story of Genesis 
the exile of man is, at the same time, the exile of God himself. That 
which was harmonious was the world where they could both walk 
together, the very same world that ceased to exist as a result of man’s 
autonomous work. 
Fear of technology comes from thinking that man’s exile from the 
‘world of the machine’ is possible; unions’ fears about workers being 
replaced by new machines and industrial processes are the visible sur-
face of a different and much greater fear. It’s not about the replace-
ment of workers on the production line, but of a change of territory. 
With technology a new space comes into being, a hostile world bursts 
forth where once there was harmony.  
But this situation cannot be interpreted as a ‘fear of change’. It is 
not a matter of some mutation, but of the transfiguration of a reality in 
tune with the creator, to one in tune with the creature. Here we find 
something that connects up with Luddism’s profound heritage. When 
machines are destroyed the real object of the destruction is not the 
machines themselves but the world created in their image. It’s not 
about a fear of being replaced or fear of change, but rather the con-
sciousness that an unfriendly world appears as a horizon of exile. The 
world cannot be predicted because it does not necessarily obey a scien-
tific logic, nor can it be submitted to an ‘impact study’. The new world’s 
laws are only predictable in the short term, not in the mid and long 
terms, where technology really manifests itself. 
Prediction of technological impact is always partial and cannot 
identify its own impacts. Technology has tattooed all over human’s 
inability to predict their action. As Ellul (1954) puts it, technological 
rationality is blind because it is human. The supposed ends to which 
technology responds are no more than the inaugural moment of its 
presence. In its development, technologies constitute a space of ration-
ality in the midst of an ocean of meaninglessness. Even if a certain 
technology has its own objectives and seems to respond to a justified 
need, the technological system as a whole does not seem to be inspired 
by any goal or necessity. 
Adam, a Golem in the hands of God, received the vital breath, the 
Divine Breath. The Word created its world. Rabbi Loew’s Golem 
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depends on a key word, on a secret code to bring it to life, but man, 
due to his creatural nature, can only give a secondary life, without the 
ability to speak. The tradition of the Golem clearly states that the prob-
lem with man’s work – technology – is the key of life, not its material-
ity. The code of life, the creative word, the vital breath; this is the 
technological problem.
The human body has just been deciphered into three thousand 
million ‘letters’, which, depending on how they are combined, result 
in an enormous variety of living forms:  bacteria, monkeys, men, etc. 
If today we’re able to ‘read’ that, it’s perfectly possible that soon we’ll 
be in a position to create life, just as if it were a matter of pronouncing 
a sentence. The digitalization of reality, through the computerized 
manipulation of the genetic code, suggests that we are facing the pos-
sibility of a computer ‘delivering’ the ‘key combination’. Technology 
would finally be able to ‘un-programme’ the ‘flaws’ of the human 
body and, above all, to ‘programme’ a new being. A universe reduced 
to a binary code would permit technologies to listen to the divine 
word and repeat it without imperfections, thus being able to create to 
God’s own image. 
A possible challenge to technological thinking does not come 
from the divine punishment imposed on Prometheus, as Frankenstein: 
The Modern Prometheus story suggests. The fear of technologies was 
modelled within the Judeo-Christian creationist myth. What conclu-
sions can we reach by replacing God with man and man with tech-
nologies in the first eleven chapters of the Book of Genesis? The 
challenge is to interpret the fear of technologies as a feeling experi-
enced towards man’s own abilities. It is no longer a matter of think-
ing of technology as a Golem, an imperfect homunculus, but as a 
‘human being’ made in its creator’s own image and likeliness. The 
perspective opened by this point of view could be a desolate one, 
not only because it would give way to an ethic of artefact worshi-
pers, but mostly because it would mean accepting that we are alone, 
both in the space-time of the universe and in the cosmos of meaning, 
and devoid of any other reference besides the one we ourselves cre-
ate and believe. 
Fear of technology’s autonomy constitutes a suspicion of the 
possibility that machines can attain their own principle of life. The 
problem of the Golem is the problem of his soul. As long as his 
breath comes not from the Divine Creator, but from man, his co-
creator, the Golem will remain clumsy and imperfect; and its pres-
ence will constitute a threat to the neighbours of the technological 
vicinity.
What does the technological system fear?
If the subject of fear of technologies concentrates all the interest for lit-
erary and cinematographic fiction, there is another topic of which we 
can only be aware by reading between the lines of the actions and dis-
courses of businesses and governments. What do technologies fear? 
What do technology companies and the countries where they do busi-
ness fear?
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We can find a clue in the Borges poem The Golem, where Judah 
Loew, a Rabbi of Prague, questions himself when facing his imperfect 
work: 
The rabbi looked upon it with tenderness
and some horror. How (he muses) 
could I give birth to this pathetic son
and abandoned inaction, which is sanity?
(Borges 1984: 261–263)
As systems, technologies seem to be afraid to ‘stop’ and ‘look behind’. 
New technologies are inconceivable without a certain belief in 
progress, in looking forward and quickening the pace toward a future 
that we are convinced is better. The political and entrepreneurial sys-
tem of new technologies fears the vanishing of the faith in progress. 
Some kind of blind conviction in the future is necessary for new tech-
nologies to be possible. Up until the dawn of the twentieth century 
this conviction was called ‘progress’; then, after World War II, it was 
referred to as ‘development’, adding here and there different adjec-
tives such as ‘sustainable’, ‘integral’, ‘economic’, etc. Looking towards 
the future, looking ahead, trusting everything will be for the better, 
constitutes unquestionable elements of the faith by which technolo-
gies are possible. 
Consequently, without a sector committed to the production of col-
lective beliefs and hopes, the technological system would be incom-
prehensible. Marketing and communication are among the key 
elements in the construction of the faith in new technologies. However, 
considering them merely from a behavioural perspective – such as 
their role in promoting or researching consumer habits – does not help 
in attaining a correct interpretation of the part played by marketing 
and communication in relation to the new technologies.
Marketing is the truth, that is to say, it’s the activity of ‘conquering 
consumers minds’ and entails the conformation of the representations, 
affections and wishes of a technological society. In this sense, the 
sources of fear arise between that which is not said and that which is 
denied: stop looking ahead, lose speed, look down, etc. New technolo-
gies are impossible without society sharing some kind of belief in 
progress. Losing that faith and hope represents our utmost fear of the 
technological system.  
Neither Rabbi Loew’s Golem nor Dr. Frankenstein’s monster have 
a name. New technologies have always held the undefined and unlim-
ited as an open field of metaphors. The great challenge for the promot-
ers of new technologies lies in stimulating the imagination of the 
possible users and consumers and in finding new appliances and uses 
for them. There is a recurring demand on the part of technicians and 
researchers for the removal of legal, budgetary and other limits in 
order to ‘freely exercise’ their right to do research without restrictions. 
The absence of limits is the only territory for a creative imagina-
tion. Nevertheless, it also represents the ground where it can be most 
easily forfeited. In that endless desert of technological imagination 
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fear arises as a means of survival: do not return, do not sink, just look 
forward and walk as fast as possible. These seem to be the unques-
tioned limits of the techno-scientific system. To look behind, go back, 
look down or slow down equals returning to prehistoric times. If 
someone dared do it, he would be branded a neo-luddite, as an enemy 
of technological progress, a fool incapable of facing ‘reality’. This is 
something that needs to be thought over because new technologies 
are unable to think of themselves without any reference to progress, 
advance and speed.  
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